A similar structural dualism, with much lower incomes, worse social conditions and higher fertility in the (relatively large) population of the rural areas. A similar concentration in the ownership of property, especially land. A similar pattern of trade, with tourist services, primary products and textiles exchanged for arms, equipment, intermediate products and sophisticated consumer goods. A similar prevalence of transnational corporations (TNCs) in secondary industry and the services (especially big hotels). Similar inappropriate technologies and associated chronic unemployment, relieved (as in many 'developing' countries especially in Central America and the Caribbean) by large-scale migration abroad. A not very different cultural dependence on foreign styles of consumption and on imported ideologies, fed by foreign firms, television programmes, etc.
The same sort of bureaucracy with a striking combination of complacency and inefficiency. Similar organised terrorism of both Right and Left and similar political manipulation by dominant powers.
Two basic politico-economic patterns characterise 'developing' countries. In one, a military dictatorship maintains a strong and stable currency by 6 creating a favourable climate for foreign capital, which implies suppressing trade union activity and political opposition; in the other, a 'soft' government is unable to resolve internal class conflicts, the symptoms of its failure being chronic inflation and foreign exchange difficulties, relieved only by periodic devaluation.' Portugal has demonstrated both patterns recentlythe former before the 1974 coup, the latter after it. Such a sudden and complete political somersault is also itself characteristic.
Roughly similar socio-economic features and patterns, including heavy dependence on labour migration and tourism, can be seen in many countries of Southern EuropeSpain, Malta, Yugoslavia, Greece, Cyprus and Turkeyand also in the Irish Republic and Finland. So 'Third World' experiencefor example in dealing with the TNCsis likely to be relevant to their problems too. Their social sciences would also gain from an injection of the work of Latin American theoristsas has indeed started to occur (Guzman, 1976) As the Cold War intensified in the l950s and former colonies became independent, political attention in the metropolitan countries focused on problems of 'underdevelopment', which were seen as potential breeding grounds for communism. When three groupings emerged in the politics of international organisationsthe 'developed' countries with high per ca pita incomes, the 'centrally planned', and the large residual category of the 'developing'the last was treated as qualitatively different and alone in need of support from aid agencies and development economists.
This tripartite division of the world was of course both novel and highly artificial. But, as I have pointed out earlier (Seers, 1976) , it did have some basis in reality. It recognised the common problems and interests of the governments of 'developing' countries vis à vis the companies and governments of richer countries) and their common historic resentments. The governments in the 'developed' countries were prepared to institute aid programmes designed, inter alia, to keep those outside the communist bloc still 'developing'. Yet it allowed the bureaucratic class in the communist countries to consider governments of various political complexions as anti-imperialist, and to lend them diplomatic support while leaving to the imperial powers themselves the responsibility for financial and technical aid.
Soon the three world classification acquired a life of its own. Typically, the governing councils of international agencies have balanced representation between 'centrally-planned', 'developed' and 'developing' countries, and so have their committees, expert groups, missions, etc. Many governments of 'developing' countries have come to consider 'Third World unity' a major source of strength. All sorts of institutions have grown up to facilitate 'South-South' and 'North-South' discussions and negotiations.
Academic work in 'developed' countries on the problems of the 'developing' countries was also influenced; though it had started much earlier, especially in the fields of anthropolgy and colonial economies. When aid departments and the United Nations agencies and regional commissions were 8 established, in response to the various political interests mentioned above, much greater opportunities were provided for both field and desk research on 'developing' countries. Special development institutions such as IDS were also set up.
Those engaged in research in this field have accepted the geographical definition used by its sponsors.4 Moreover, one is bound to say that some of it has not been as objective as is perhaps customary in the social sciences. There has been an implicit assumption that the ultimate goals would be European-style political institutions and levels of living within a capitalist systembasically the same goals as those of colonial governments.
Many researchers in colonial times and subsequently have also assumed (usually tacitly) that those with political power were sufficiently motivated and efficient to achieve these ends, and that they could and would make good use of technical and financial assistance. This has amounted to a new (though very different) 'trahaison des clercs'. Elaborate models were worked out to help policymakers accelerate economic growth and (when political concerns changed) to deal with problems such as high-level manpower shortages, unemployment, inequality and poverty. Development research in all these areas has been marked by conceptual imprecision and a very casual use of statisticsas was inevitable if 'results' were to be provided for policy-makers, but primary data were meagre or non-existent.
Several development courses were established in Europe. These were more or less explicitly designed to 'train' people how to run their own countries (often being succesors to colonial service courses), though they sometimes also had places for those from 'developed' countries who were primarily interested in the problems of the 'Third role is to acknowledge the obvious social and political problems in our own country; the second is to accept the validity and utility of nationalism as a shield against dependence; and the third to re&lise that transfers of resources to countries which are poorer may well, given the extent of our own problems and the difficulties of reaching those in real need, not increase net welfare. For some, the next step after this is to search for interface policies that will reconcile the needs of those in developed and developing countries.
Others see their task as exploringin alliance with the ecologistswhat changes in lifestyles in developed countries would relieve the pressure on oil and other scarce resources, thus creating greater economic space for satisfying basic needs in poorer countries. I will not go into detail here on the pros and cons of these new approaches. They are certainly much healthier than the old concern with the policies of foreign governments. But they raise big questions of political feasibility and do not entirely avoid the invidious task of defining other people's needs. Perhaps some European social scientists need to draw more far-reaching conclusions. The kernel of development studies will surely become the concentration of economic and political power, and the consequent creation of poverty, both absolute and relative, wherever this occurs, not just in the so-called Third World, but also in Europe. This process of marginalisation is not purely economic: it includes threats to national, regional or ethnic identity. Its study involves analysis of the institutions, especially international which in various ways transmit the techniques, tastes, theories and ideologies that generate inequalityincluding inequalities between and within European countries. Explaining its causal dynamics leads into deeper historical, as well as broader geographical, analysis than has been customary in our field so far. lt means investigating the origins of the present world structure, especially the creation and disolution of the colonial system, which was of course based in Europe, and drawing on all parts of the world for case studies in teaching as well as research.
The professionalisation of development studies will be helped by their extension to European countries and vice versa. Besides providing fresh insights into iiational and regional problems in Europe, the application of development analysis there will make obsolete, at least in academic work, the professionally dubious distinction between 'developed' and 'developing' countries, lo the models and the emulators.5 Conversely, it is difficult to extend development studies to Europe until we have discarded a classification of countries which originated primarily in political expediency.
That there are strongly entrenched vested interests against this change of emphasis is implicit in the foregoing analysis. To abandon the 'Third World' as a category, and give up using the phrase itself, would dilute the political cement holding together a coalition which has become even more useful to the governments of the countries concerned. 'North-South' negotiations would lose their rationale:6 indeed both 'North' and 'South' would disappear as concepts (though of course the basic issues of commodity and energy policy and so forth would still need to be discussed).
The new approach threatens the political con- We are brought back therefore to the oldfashioned conclusion that academics had best use long spoons when supping with politicians. Their immunity from political pressures has been defended on the ground that it was necessary for innovative professional work. In development studies, this defence has been imparied. I am not, however, suggesting that the subject's social relevance should be reduced; rather that those inside government or outside should be left to draw whatever conclusions are relevant to their own occupation, nationality and ideology. The study of the constraints on national policy is potentially significant for people of many types, inside or outside government. Politicians and officials may well take more notice of the contributions of academics who are less partisan, and therefore more readily reconsider the assumptions on which their aproaches are based. But that would be so-to-speak a by-product. A mofe important result of some degree of detachment of development studies from the aid lobby is that this would facilitate the coverage of European problems. While it can be argued plausibly (if perhaps mistakenly) that development theory and experience, as conventionally defined, can contribute little to the analysis of the problems of countries such as the United States and the Soviet Union, this is obviously untrue of Portugal and other countries in the European periphery. They provide the bridge for the extension and thus professionalisation of development studies.
